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Some Characteristics of Recent Export Expansion in Latin America
Carlos F. o{az-Alejandro*
Yale University
LDC foreign trade policies, whether exphasizing import-substitu tion
or export-promotio n, are only part of their overall development strategies.
How important a part is a matter to be discussed, although as a general
rule, one can state that such part will be relatively greater the smaller
the country.

Economic size of country, of course, will heavily influence

the costs and benefits to be derived from public policies aiming to foster
import substitution or exports.
The literature on trade policies and their influence on development
is vast and contradictory, and has been reviewed elsewhere. 1

The literature

on the negative consequences of that part of import substitution which goes
beyond the dictates of comparative advantage, infant industry and optimum
tariff arguments is also mountainous.

This paper, therefore, will focus on

a preliminary interpretation of some aspects of recent Latin American
export expansion policies which have been relatively neglected, or which
are still controversial.
1.

The major questions can be put as follows:

In what sense, if any, were import substitution policies a necessary

precondition for the export expansion registered in the largest Latin American
countries during the 1960s? What about for the 1970s?
2.

Have the smallest Latin American countries benefited from the new export

expansion?
3.

Is there a foreign trade "small country problem" in Latin America?

How drastic a policy change was/is necessary to switch a country from an

import substituting strategy toward an outward looking one?
been the key policy instruments in that switch?

What seem to have
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By how much can export promotion policies influence the different

development objectives of the Latin American nations?

How much does

foreign trade policy "matter" for the different targets?

If an idea 1

''assignment " of instruments to targets can be visualized. to achieving
what development targets should trade policy be assigned?
It should be borne in mind that Latin American experience in switching

from a strategy emphasizing import substitutio n toward one giving greater
importance to export promotion is relatively recent.

If a single date

is wanted for such a switch (and for the whole region!), the mid-sixties
is as good as any alternative .

So the returns are not all in, and what

follows must be taken as a mixture of observed facts, hypotheses and
speculation .
A review of some facts
To begin answering the major questions raised above, one must subdivide
"Latin America" into plausible and manageable groups of countries.

One

possible grouping is presented in Table 1, which documents the postwar
decline of the Latin American share in world exports.

That subdivision

follows size, as measured by population, except for Venezuela, whose oil
resources make her a very special case.

In 1970, the relative importance

of the different groups in total Latin American population and merchandise
exports were as follows:
Percentage of
Total 1970
Population
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico
Venezuela
Chile, Cuba, Peru
Central American Common Mark et
Other small countries

68.3

Percentage of
Total 1970
Merchandise Exports

11.0

42.0
16.8
21.1
7.0
13 .0

Total

100%

100%

Absolute Values

278.8 Million

3.9
11.4

5.4

$15.8 Billion
U.S. Dollars
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It may be seen in Table 1 that for all groups the 1970-71 share was
below that for 1948-49.

The steady decline in the share of the largest

countries, however, was the most spectacular.

These are the countries

where policies to induce import substitution were pursued with particular
vigor (as they were also in the medium-sized country, Chile) during the
postwar.

But these are also the countries alleged to benefit most from the

new export boom.

More on this below.

A point often ignored in discussions relating to the decline in
Latin America's share in world exports is that such participation was
abnormally high during the immediate postwar, simply because the Western
Hemisphere was spared the ravages of war on its soil.

Table 2 presents a

comparison of pre- and post-war shares (using slightly different data than
Table 1).

By 1951 the shares of all groups of countries were still

higher than what they had been in 1938; even as late as 1969 the shares
of fortunate Venezuela and the Central American Common Market were higher
than their corresponding 1938 figures.
Between 1938 and 1948, all of the indicated groups of Latin American
countries saw their merchandise exports expand at annual rates exceeding
10 per cent, at current dollars.

As may be seen in Table 3. however. the

spread in growth rates for the different groups during 1948-58 was much
greater, with the biggest and the intermediate countries, except Venezuela,
showing growth rates inferior to those of their population.

Falling

dollar prices for major non-oil Latin American exports, an influence which
for those years may be on the whole regarded as exogenous, no doubt
contributed to this poor performance.

But in spite of that negative

influence, the Central American and other small countries did reasonably
well relative to world and all-LDC rates of export expansion.
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After the weak export performan ce of 1948-58 there has been a
widesprea d tendency for faster and more stable 2 export expansion , even
though such growth remains, on the whole, lower than that for the world
and even that for all LDCs.

No simple correlatio n appears to exist for

1958-71 between country size and overall export performan ce.

Only for

the most recent, but short period of 1968-71, one notices a clear pulling
ahead of the largest countries .

Prelimina ry figures for 1972 indicate that

at least for the largest countries the accelerat ion in export growth
continues .

But in 1970 the per capita merchandi se export of the biggest

countries , at current dollars, were still only slightly higher than their
1950 levels, suggestin g a drop in the real value of per capita exports.
The percentag e increases in per capita merchandi se exports, expressed in
current dollars, between 1950 and 1970, were as follows:
Argentina , Brazil, Colombia, Mexico

8.4%

Venezuela

14.1

Chile, Cuba, Peru

80.8

Central American Common Market
Other small countries

112.6
62.9

A closer look at the export performan ce of the different groups of
Latin American countries for 1960-71 has been made possible by a 1973
document of the U.N. Economic Commissio n for Latin America (UNECLA), which
disaggreg ates exports by geograph ical destinati on, and separates primary
products from manufactu red exports.

Th.e latter are defined as those

included in section S, 6 (excludin g non-ferro us metals, chapter 68), 7
and 8 of the Standard Internati onal Trade Classific ation (SITC).

It

should be noted that this definitio n terids to underestim ate manufactu red
exports, as it leaves out processed foodstuff s, for example.
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Table 4 presents average annual growth rates for different groups and
categories of merchandise exports, based on the UNECLA data, which are
expressed at current dollars.

Several points are worth noting.

Once

again, no simple correlation between country size and overall export
performance is evident.

The growth rate for manufactured exports from the

biggest countries, however, is quite impressive, and clearly exceeds that
for small countries not associated with the Central American common market.
The expansion of primary product exports during 1960-71 was substantial.
It was aided by the recovery of dollar prices for many Latin American exports,

3/
which hit (recent) bottom in the early 1960s,but also by the incorporation
to the export lists of several countries of primary products not there
during the 1950s.

Naturally, what is a "new" primary product to one country

may be an "old" one to another, but nevertheless this fact has been ignored
in much of the literature on export expansion.

Finally, Table 4 shows that

for all groups of countries, exports to fellow Latin Americans have grown
substantially faster than to the rest of the world.

It will be recalled that

during the 1960s several preferential trading arrangements were in force
within Latin America.

They include the Latin American Free Trade Association

(LAFTA), the Central American Common Market (CACM), and the Caribbean Free
Trade Association (CARIFTA).

More recently, the Andean Common Market is

developing within LAFTA.
Growth rates by themselves can be misleading if base years show very
different export patterns among countries.

Table 5 presents the contribution

made by different types of exports to the total increase between 1960 and
1971 in the exports of the various groups.
be noticed.

Here some sharper contrasts can

The only group for which increases in manufactured exports

going outside Latin America made a substantial contribution to the overall

'\
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export expansion, was in that formed by the biggest countries.

Increments

in any kind of manufactured exports made very small contributions to
export expansion in Venezuela, Chile, Peru and the non-Central American
small countries.

Finally, note that even in the biggest countries primary

products represented more than sixty per cent of the increase in all
exports.
Before completing this statistical review, a point which is partly
"accounting" and partly "economics" should be made.

Consider the expansion

of manufactured exports within the Central American Common Market.

Those

exports have been added, dollar for dollar, with Central American exports
going to the rest of the world.
not really the same thing.

Yet in economic terms those dollars are

The difference can be expressed in two ways.

The dollar earned by Nicaragua exporting manufactures to Costa Rica, for
example, is much more tied to expanding imports from that or other partner,
than a dollar earned by Nicaragua exporting cotton to the rest of the world.
Given the pressures for "reciprocity" within preferential trading zones,
the first type of export cannot be expected to improve Nicaragua's balance
of payments even in the medium run.

More fundamentally, the dollar

prices at which intra-common market trade takes place can differ from
equivalent prices in world markets, reflecting to a larger or smaller degree
trade diversion.

As preferential trading arrangements expand their shares

in LDC trade, it will become increasingly important to disaggregate total
export figures by products and zones, and to obtain some rough idea of
preference margins existing within preferential zones.

Trade in manufactures,

of course, should be particularly watched in this respect.
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A related point has been emphasized by my colleague Benjamin I. Cohen.
Consider now the expansion of manufactured exports from the ~iggest
Latin American countries.

These include items such as those produced in

Mexico's border with the U.S.A., under special provisions, and which embody
a very high import component, in some cases adding only 20 per cent of local
value added to imported materials.

Clearly, an additional (gross).dollar

of those exports has economic implications very different from additional
exports of a more traditional kind.

With the spread in LDCs of assembly-type

export-oriented activities, greater care in analyzing overall gross export
figures will be needed.

The concept of "returned value, 11 applied to LDC

mineral exports, could also be applied to those new activities.
Both points suggest that the high growth rates observed during the 1960s
and early 1970s in LDC manufactured exports may give an overly optimistic
view of what is going on.

But the exact extent of the bias remains to be

quantified.
Import substitution:

a necessary precondition to expanding exports?

We can now return to our major questions, listed at the beginning
of the paper.

In the previous section it was seen that even for the big

four Latin American countries, primary products accounted for more than half
of the export expansion between 1960 and 1971.

A closer look at what lies

behind this part of export expansion is warranted.
Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 present the contribution made to total export
expansion between 1960 and 1970, 1971 or 1972, of the ten most important
export lines during the latter years in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and
Mexico.

The tables list products according to their rank in the export

lists for 1970, 1971 or 1972.

The exact definition of a given export

product, or group of products, is of course arbitrary.

The exact ranking

-8-

of product is also sensitive to the end-year used, particularly for Argentina.
But these tables emphasize the continued importance for export expansion of
items from agriculture, livestock, fishing and mining, even in the case of
the largest Latin American nations.

Furthermore, several of the items

shown reached the top ten export list in recent years even though in 1960
their contribution to exports was either zero or very small.

Examples

include Argentine sorghum, Brazilian soybeans, Colombian sugar~/ and
Mexican beef.

Similar considerations apply to smaller Latin American countries.

Tables 6 through 9 also show the diversified nature of post-1960 export
expansion for the large countries; such expansion was based on many items,
each contributing a relatively small share.

Data on the geographical

destination of Latin American exports, not shown, also indicate a healthy growth
of market diversification.
Assuming the continuation of world trade expansion, and with appropriate
domestic policies, much, and even most, of the future export growth of the
biggest Latin American countries will be based on new and old primary products
and raw materials, even if one regards the 1972-73 commodity boom as abnormal.
This is hardly surprising in a world where the United States "rediscovers"
its comparative advantage in temperate-zone primary products, where the
big powers base their trade on items such as wheat, corn and natural gas,
where there is a nee-Malthusian preoccupation with the exhaustion of supplies
of several raw materials, and where ''unnatural" synthetics are suspected.
What is surprising is that not long ago there were some economists who
advised Argentina to get out of meat and corn because those products had no
future in international trade, while others argued that steel, not wheat,
was the foundation of geopolitical power.
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Granting that old and new primary products remain a key element in
Latin American export plans, and that misguide d import substitu tion
policies could have only hurt their prospec ts,1/ it may still be argued
that import substitu tion was a necessar y precond ition to the expansio n
of manufac tured exports.

This viewpoin t may be summariz ed by the dictum

that ''Brazi 1 could not have exported Volkswa gens without having import
substitu ted them first."

It can also be noted that Table 5 showed that

only the biggest countrie s, which followed aggressi ve import- substitu tion
policies , have been able to achieve substan tial exports of manufac tures
outside Latin America .
One can distingu ish at least two versions of this argumen t, which in
my view have very differen t degrees of validity .

The most acceptab le

version is that which stresses the difficul ty involved in an LDC (or any
country) setting up an industry which from the start is heavily oriented
toward foreign markets.

There are examples of such industri es, but the

normal cycle seems to be for an activity to first start operatin g with
sales to the domestic market, with or without competi tion from imports,
and then, once its domestic base and overhead are assured, move on abroad
in search of markets, most frequen tly using margina l cost pricing ("dumpin g"),
and often using protecti ve schemes to monopol ize the home market.
A stronger version of the argumen t stresses the need to have an
integrat ed and diversif ied industr ial structur e before one can develop
substan tial manufac tured exports .
11

While the former version points to a

normal'' cycle in specific industr ial activiti es, the latter emphasiz es

the whole industr ial sector.
The first version should give little comfort to those who say that the
import substitu tion policies of the 1950s were really necessa ry for developi ng

-10manufactured exports in the 1970s.

First of all, the industries which arose

in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, already in the early part of the
Twentieth Century (and even earlier in some cases), did so with modest levels
of old fashioned tariff protection, and did not require comprehensive. post
war-type policies of import substitution.

The textile, shoe and cement

industries, for example, arose mostly as a result of normal market incentives,
with only modest (relative to post-war protection) prodding from tariff
policies.

Secondly, it stretches the imagination to argue that the 1973

exports of Brazilian shoes, or Colombian textiles, or Argentine books, or
Mexican frozen strawberries, would not have been possible without the import
substitution policies of the 1950s.

Indeed, exports of many of these items

6/
already occurred in the 1930s and 1940s,-

as a consequence of those policies.

and dried up during the 1950s

Had different policies been followed,

say during 1950-65,l/ the emerging industrial sector would have been somewhat
more specialized, and specific industries would have proceeded through their
"normal" maturing cycle (first domestic market, then exports) more smoothly
and efficiently.

The premature widening of industry would have been avoided.

A counter to the above is that in such scenario manufactured exports
would have been limited to "simple" products, and the entry into export lists
of nsophisticated" items, such as petrochemicals, would have been delayed.
This is quite true.

But one can doubt the economic benefits for the region

of many "sophisticated" exports which now appear in the export lists of
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico.

Note that a significant difference

appears to exist between manufactured exports going to other Latin American
countries, and those going to the rest of the world.

The former tend to be

more "sophisticated" but also, alas, more capital- and import-intensive.
For example, Colombian exports of cotton textiles, leather and wood manufactures
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go primarily outside LAFTA, while exports of inorganic chemicals,
pharmaceutical products, plastics and rubber tires go overwhelmingly to
LAFTA.

The two types of exports, of course, will have different

consequences for real incomes, the balance of payments, employment, etc.
Much of the intra-regional "sophisticated" exports simply represent an
effort to recoup the losses arising from excessive import substitution of
previous years, often at the expense of trade partners.

More worrisome

is that some of them could also be symptoms that excesses committed by
national import substitution policies are now being repeated at the regional
level.

And, to make matters worse, it appears that a good share of that

trade does not even benefit Latin American entrepreneurs.
To explore further one of these conjectures, the shares of different
Colombian exports, excluding coffee and crude petroleum, going to LAFTA,
were correlated with the capital-labor ratios computed by Gary Hufbaue~/
for the U.S., on the assumption that the industry ranking would be the
same for Colombia.

Taking the 62 three-digit SITC chapters for which

Colombian minor exports exceeded one hundred thousand dollars in 1969, and
for which matching capital-labor ratios were available in the Hufbauer
study, the following result was obtained;
(Share of exports going to LAFTA) =

-128.2 + 18.1
(3.9)

(log. of capital-labor ratio)

R2 =
F

Observations

=

0.20
15 .24

= 62

While capital intensity is only one of the many variables which
influence whether a given item is exported to LAFTA or elsewhere,
the t-ratio shown in parentheses indicates that there
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is a clearly significant positive link between LAFTA shares and capital
intensity.

Preliminary results obtained by Larry Senger also show a

significant link between LAFTA shares and the use of imported inputs for
the Colombian case.
Further research

is

needed on these points, to clarify the extent

to which some of the new exports really represent harmful trade diversion.
I should make clear that on balance I consider the moves toward La.tin
American integration as very positive, partly for political reasons, and
that these warnings are made in the spirit of trying to guard against
economic excesses spoiling a good thing.

Furthermore, at. the purely

economic level, both a glance at the existing industrial structures of
Latin American countries, which contain much duplication from country to
country, and the Linder thesis, should convince us that there is much
potential trade creation which can be realized by Latin American integration.
So long as world trade continues to expand, and present policies in the
big four are roughly maintained, there is little· reason to doubt that their
manufactured exports will continue to expand at healthy rates.

Such

expansion could have started earlier, but better late than never.fl
The export performance of the smaller countries
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico have populations which in
1970 ranged from 22 to 93 million.

Venezuela, Chile, Peru and Cuba ranged,

in the same year, from 8 to 14 million in population.

The rest of the

Latin American countries had populations in 1970 no higher than 6 million
inhabitants.

It was seen earlier that the overall export performance of

these small countries since the second world war has been better than that
of the biggest countries.

However, in these countries manufactured exports

to markets outside Latin America

have made only very modest contribution
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to overall export growth. and in the most recent years their export growth
rate appears to be sagging.

Is there, or will there be, a "small-country

foreign-trade problem'· in Latin America, as it is said to exist in Africa?
First of all. note that our small country category includes countries
as different in per capita incomes as Haiti and Uruguay.

Yet the issue

remains. even if precise definitions of the "small countrv problem" are
hard to find.
The concept of a foreign-trade problem for a small country is a strange
one from the viewpoint of traditional pure trade theorv.

Small countries

presumably would have under autarky verv different relative prices from
those ruling in world markets, and thus can be presumed to gain a great
deal from trade.

Furthermore, their smallness should imply that they face

an almost perfectly elastic world demand for their exports. new or old.
worry here about meeting the Marshall-Lerner condition!

No

So what is the

problem?
The actual or potential instability associated with high degrees of
specialization could be part of the answer.

Economies of scale in manufacturing

can also limit the range of profitable economic opportunities for these
countries.

More importantly, it is likely that the smaller the country. the

less dense or the more discontinuous its chain of comparative advantage will
be.

In other words,

to a greater extent than in the large countries, the

small nations are characterized by one or two staples in which they have
obvious and clear comparative advantage.

Indeed, economic history shows that

the formation of some small countries as independent units was closely
interlinked to the expansion of those key staples. Obvious examples are the
oil emirates around the Persian gulf.

But between these items and those

which follow in terms of comparative advantage, a large gap frequently exists.
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The policy problem created by severe discontinut ies in the chain
of comparative advantage is aggravated in small countries by another factor.
In general. large countries have a greater range of policy tools at their
disposal than small ones.
of this generalizat ion.

Exchange rat~ policy is the clearest example
As in large countries pure tradeable goods are

a smaller share of the total absorption basket than in the small, they can
use exchange rate policy more aggresively to promote new exports, across the
board.

The small countries are farther away from approaching optimum currency

size, in the McKinnon sense, particularl y when most of their foodstuffs are
either importables or exportables , and thus lose much of. the use of exchange
rate policy as a weapon of export promotion.
more selective and less across-the-b oard.

Their promotion has to be

But it is precisely in these

countries where it is particularl y difficult to find out which is the "next"
activity in the potential export list.

While in the larger countries

generalized incentives can be expected to be met by market responses which
will

reveal gradually the chain of comparative advantage. such across-the

board incentives in small countries will both threaten monetary stability
and generate large quasi-rents (as well as pure rents), to a much larger
extent than in present-day large countries.
One can then, a priori., sketch a small-count ry foreign-trad e problems.
Whether the "problem' has greater quantitativ e weight than the advantages of
being small in internation al trade, discussed earlier, and which also include
a greater "export mentality" and less temptations to launch misguided impor:t
substitutin g schemes,is

unclear, at least for Latin America.

So far. small

countries have done reasonably well in exporting. but their future performance
may be less bright, and may induce further efforts in their part toward
regional integration .
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The transition toward export_promotio n in the biggest countries
This section will outline what appear to me to be the major features
of the ''new' export promotion policies of the biggest Latin American
countries.

Given space limitations, the presentation will be brief.

The

reader is again reminded that the experiences to be discussed are quite
recent, and require much more analysis than is provided here.
A fundamental feature of the new export promotion policies is that they
have involved a package of measures.
to include most of the following:

The package is generally expected

(1) a more favorable real exchange rate;

(2) a more stable real exchange rate; (3) some kind of drawback schemes,
exempting exporters from import duties and other import restrictions;
(4) other tax concessions, such as exemptions from income and sales taxes;
(5) special credit facilities, at favorable (subsidized) interest rates;
(6) subsidization of other export expenses, such as insurance. freight,

promotional expenses abroad, etc.; (7) use of the many regulatory powers of
the state (e.g., import controls, investment licensing, agricultural policies.
regional policies, etc.,) to exert subtle and not-so-subtle pressure on
producers receiving any kind of public support (i.e., most large enterprises)
to export an increasing share of their output.

Preferential trading

arrangements can be regarded as yet another form of export promotion.

As noted earlier, it is reasonably clear that the package is succeeding
in generating larger exports of all kinds.

But is it difficult to parcel

out credit for the success among the different policy instruments.
Particularly in the cases of Brazil and Colombia, the adoption of a crawling
l C1 /
·
· t h e po 1 icy
.
h as b een an important
.
pac k age.e 1ement 1n
Peg exc h ange ra t e po 11cv
But note that in neither country the exchange rate applied to non-coffee exports
(also excluding crude oil exports in the case of Colombia), when suitably

-16deflated was significant ly higher during 1969-71 than it was during
1960-62.

The basic data are as follows:·!.!/

Average exports exchange
rate applied to
non-coffee exEorts
Brazil
Colombia
(New cruzeiros
(Pesos per
per U.S.dollars dollar)

Brazilian
Wholesale
Prices
Deflated by
U.S. Wholesale
Prices
1963=100

Colombian
Wholesale
Prices
Deflated by
''Real" exchange ratef
U.S. Wholesale
Prices
Brazil
Colombia
1963=100

1960

0.158

6.92

26.9

72.90

0.587

9.61

1961

0. 251

8.30

38.0

77.1

0.661

10. 77

1962

0.360

9 .14

56.8

79 .0

0.634

11.57

1969

3.998

17.32

643.3

160.4

0.621

10.80

1970

4.575

18.45

741.4

166.5

0.617

11.08

1971

5.251

20.01

870.6

177.1

0.603

11.30

According to these data, for Colombia the "real" export exchange rate
during 1969- 71 was only 4 per cent above its average leve 1 of 1960-62; for
Brazil it was 2 per cent below.

It is of course true that relative to

Western Europe and Japan these data imply significant real devaluation , but
only for recent years, and it may also be true that the key relationship
between the exchange rate and unskilled money wages changed substantial ly in
both countries.

But the major contributio n of pure exchange rate policy

to export promotion in Brazil and Colombia seems to be rather in stabilizing
the real exchange rate received by exporters.

The crawling peg allows

exporters to avoid the disastrous consequence s of violent swings in the
real value, in local currency, of their exchange earnings.

In analyzing

econometric ally the supply response of Colombian minor exports to exchange
rate policy during the postwar period, I have found that an index of the
stability of the real exchange rate emerges with coefficient s which are not

-17. h 1y signi
. . f 1can,
on 1y h ig
.
t b ut a 1so o f su b stanti· a 1 quant·itativ
· e weig
· h t .12
-/
The fiscal , credit and other incent ives given to expor ters
in the
bigges t countr ies, such as the Colom bian certif icate of tax
exemp tion
("CAT" using its Spanis h initia ls) and the genero us Brazi lian
income
tax conces sions, do give expor ters substa ntial real subsid
ies, not so
easily availa ble during the early 1960s.

While many of these scheme s are

across the board, their incide nce on firms of differ ent sizes
can vary,
compl icating the analy sis.

Many other export incent ives, such as direct

govern ment promo tion abroad or pressu re on home indus tries
to export ,
are almost impos sible to quanti fy and relate system atical ly
to, regist ered
expor t expans ion.
These comments sugge st a second fundam ental featur e of the
new
expor t promo tion polici es.

In the critiq ue of postwa r import substi tuting

polici es, very freque ntly those polici es were contra sted with
textbo ok-typ e
neocla ssical polici es.

The new export promo tion measu res, howev er, althou gh

reduci ng the tilt of incent ives away from import subst itutio
n and toward
expor ts, have mainta ined a good deal of the centra lizatio n,
govern ment
interv ention and ad-hoc kery associ ated with the old polici
es.

To some extent ,

it has been simply a matter of redire cting the zeal of interv
ention ist
public offici als from import substi tution toward expor t promo
tion.

In fact,

for indus trial expor ts, often the same large firms which,
workin g closel y
with the govern ment, benefi ted most from protec tion, are those
reapin g the
highe st profit s from the new export incent ives.
In short, contra ry to the gloomy warnin gs of the most orthod
ox, the
switch from empha sis on import substi tution toward expor t
promo tion did
not involv e a massiv e disma ntling of the interv ention ist state
appara tus
built up during the postw ar.

While incent ives have been redire cted toward
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export promotio n, consider able protecti on is still a fact of life in the
largest (and other) Latin American countrie s.

In countrie s with large

non-trad eable (or subsiste nce) sectors, a public policy of simultan eous
promotio n of both exports and import- substitu tion need not be an
impossi bility.

Indeed, as already noted, some of the distorti ons associat ed

with the "import substitu tion syndrom e," such as quantita tive restrict ions
on imports, and credit rationin g with subsidiz ed rates, can be turned around
and used to encourag e or pressure establis hed finns to export, as has been
the case in Colombia since 1967.

Finally, and again contrary to some

orthodox warning s, it has not been necessar y to eliminat e domestic
inflatio n as a prerequ isite for expandin g exports.
The above, of course, says nothing regardin g the optimal ity of the new
policie s.

All it argues is that they are working in achievin g their

immedia te aim of raising export earning s, without drastic changes in other
policie s.

In fact, it is quite likely that "excesse s" in export promotio n,

similar to those observed under import substitu tion, will become increasi ngly
noted.

But on balance, there are reasons to think that even granting the

possibi lity of excesses , basic asymmet ries remain between third-be st
public policies of import substitu tion and export promotio n. with the weight
of opinion favoring the latter on efficien cy and growth grounds . l)/
Export promotio n and the several developm ent targets
Much of the export promotio n literatu re is tinged with a Panglos ian
optimism which can be quite mislead ing.

Let me close this paper on a

skeptic al note, emphasiz ing the limitati ons of export promotio n for achievin g
at least some importan t developm ent targets.
There is little doubt that the new trade policies are contribu ting
to higher growth rates in the real Gross Nationa l Products of many
Latin America n countrie s.

The export and growth pessimi sts of the early

-191960s have been proven wrong.

The mechanics linking export and GNP

growth have been discussed often, and they of course can have different
quantitative importance depending primarily on country size.

Here I

would only like to add my hunch that in the biggest countries the
favorable effects of the new policies have come about not so much as a
result of a long-run reallocation of resources from inefficient import
substituting activities toward efficient export industries, but more as a
result of the elimination of damaging stop-go cycles which had been
caused by the erratic management of balance of payments and macroeconomic
short-run policies.

In other words, the "foreign exchange constraint"

limiting the growth of many Latin American countries during most of the
postwar, a constraint to a large extent induced by domestic policies,
braked growth not in a smooth and steady way, but operating via the abortion
of upward swings in economic activity.

As domestic expansion pressed on the

balance of payments, the fiscal and monetary brakes were slammed, as the
authorities were fearful of exchange rate devaluations.

The crawling peg,

then,emerges as a key element of the new policies. not only because of the
security it gives exporters, but also because of its contribution to smooth
macroeconomic policies.
There has been a tendency to assume that the new policies will
encourage growth and tend to improve significantly income distribution.
This I doubt.

Firstly, periods of faster growth are typically accompanied

by worsening income distribution.

Secondly, as noted earlier, a good

share of export expansion in Latin America is based on land-intensive
primary products and raw materials.

When land, or mineral deposits, 2.re

unequally distributed, such expansion will benefit rents captured by a
small fraction of the population.

Furthermore, foodstuffs such as sugar
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and beef are growing in importance in the export lists of several
Latin American countries.

As foodstuffs weigh more heavily in the consumption

basket of lower-incom e groups, changes in domestic relative prices induced
by the greater opening of the economy, or the transfer of many foodstuffs
from the category of "non-tradea bles" to that of "exportable s, 11 can exert a
regressive influence on real income distribution .

In other words, an

Argentine-ty pe conflict between efficient foreign trade policies and an
equitable income distributio n may be in the making for more Latin American
countries.

And it is not obvious that most of those countries have the will

to use instruments such as land taxes to resolve the conflict.
Thirdly, also as noted earlier, many of the new manufacture d exports can
not

be labelled labor-inten sive, particularly those going to partners in

preferentia l trading arrangement s.

Even those manufacture d exports going

to the rest of the world, and apparently closer to the labor-inten sive category
(i.e.,textil es), are often produced in the largest firms in the country,
having much higher capital-lab or ratios than smaller firms which hardly
enter into exporting, at least in Latin America.

It has been reported that

in Brazil, around 1970, only eleven companies accounted for more than 50
14/
per cent of the manufacture d exports of that country.-

I have estimated

that for Colombia 24 indus tria 1 companies accounted for 62 per cen.t: of a 11
industrial exports in 1970.

Of those 24 firms, ten were foreign-own ed.

accounting for 27 per cent of all industrial exports.
In short, a simple application of vague principles derived from
a two-factor Heckscher-O hlin-Sanuels on view of internation al trade is
unlikely to be of much help in tracing the impact of growing Latin American
exports on income distributio n, and may even give the wrong qualitative
answer.

Sugar and coffee, after all, have historicall y been produced both

-21on large estates and by peasant farmers, and both under systems of slavery
and socialism.

Textiles in Colombia are produced both in very large firms,

which are highly capitalized, and at the handicraft level.

Indeed, during

the early postwar, Peronist policies in Argentina encouraged import
substitution and improved income distribution (as well as urban employment)
partly by favoring small and medium sized firms.
In countries where handicrafts make up a small share of employment,
and where policies do not excessively induce capital-using techniques, one
can expect that high overall growth will lead to a fast expansion of employment.
Note that the mechanism is likely to go from trade and macro policies which
reduce the foreign exchange bottleneck and stop-go cycles, to higher growth
and thus to higher employment, rather than being based on any sharp difference
betweem the direct and indirect use of labor per unit of import-substituting
vs. exported output.

The difference in labor use per unit of output between

non-tradeable (home) goods and all tradeable goods is likely, in fact, to be
greater than such difference between the import-substituting and export sectors.
It is also well to remember that the goal of reducing open unemployment
in LDCs is quite distinct from the target of reducing the worst forms of
poverty. as those heads of household at the bottom third of the income scale
cannot afford the search time often possible for the young and women openly
unemployed in the cities.
One last skeptical note deals with the benefits which national
entrepreneurs, and more generally the Latin American goal of greater automy,
can expect to derive from export expansion, particularly of manufactured
exports.

Here again the situation in Latin American may be different

from that in the Far East.

Be that as it may, a remarkable share

-22of the expansion of Latin American manufactured exports has been accounted
by foreign-owned firms operating within the area.

For 1969, for example,

a large sample revealed that about 44 per cent of intra-LAFTA manufactured
exports were handled by 175 companies owned 90 per cent or more by foreigners,
while another 14 per cent was accounted by joint ventures, for which foreign
15/
ownership ranged from 30 to 90 per cent.-

It has been widely recognized

that ''institution building" is a key part of the development process.

Surely

the creation of companies under national ownership, public or private, which
can engage in the search of export markets must be part of "institution
building."
In keeping close watch on the consequences of the new foreign trade
policies on income distribution, employment and on national ownership and
control of its own economic life,

Latin American policy-makers, of course,

should avoid the temptation of throwing out the baby of export expansion
together with the bathwater of its undesirable or ambiguous side-effects.
But they should also be on guard against a "tied sale" which would have the
region buying some bathwater together with the new baby, and against the
naive hope that trade policy instruments by themselves can achieve all of
the various Latin American policy targets.

The 1960s and early 1970s have

shown that national trade policy does indeed matter, and matters a lot, in
breaking the foreign exchange bottleneck, in helping to reduce stop-go cycles,
and therefore, for increasing the overall growth rate.

Its side effects on

income distribution, employment and national autonomy are less clear.

In

particular, trade policy by itself cannot be expected to alleviate mass
proverty in the largest countries, where most of the people are, within any
reasonable time span.
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Table l
Latin American Exports as Percentag es of World Exports, 1948-1971
(Mainly IFS data)

Argentina ,
Brazi 1,
Colombia,
Mexico

Venezuela

Chile.
Cuba.
Peru

Central
American
Common
Market

Other
small
countries

1948-49

6 .15

1.96

2.09

0.45

1. 27

1950-54

5.27

2.01

1.82

0.50

1.24

1955-59

3.86

2.46

1. 57

0.4 7

1.04

l.960-64

3.06

1.92

1.30

0.41

1.00

1965-69

2.59

1.28

1.19

0.44

0.84

1970- 71

2.28

0.98

1.19a

0.38

0. 71

aRefers to 1970 only
Sources and method:

Data, except for Cuba, obtained from the Internati onal

Monetary Fund, Internati onal Financial Statistic s.

Data for Cuba obtained from

United Nations, Yearbook of Internati onal Trade Statistic s.

Total world exports

· given by this latter publicatio n are larger than those given in the Internati onal
Financial Statistic s, which have been used for this table.

"Other small countries '·

include Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay, Panama,
Guyana, Jamaica "Ind Trinidad and Tobago.

Uruguay.
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Table 2
Latin American Exports as Percentag es of World Exports, 1938-69
(U.N. data)
Argentina ,
Brazil,
Colombia,
Mexico

Venezuela

Chile,
Cuba,
Peru

Central
American
Common
Market

Other
small
countries

1938

4 .11

0.77

1.50

0.31

0.90

1948

6.27

1.92

2.10

0.41

0.83

'1951

4.94

1.66

1. 72

0.41

1.05

1961

2. 71

1. 78

1.21

0.34

0.90

1969

2.18

0.93

0.95

0.36

0.67

Sources and method:
several issues.

United Nations, Yearbook of Internati onal Trade Statistic s,

Total world exports in this source include exports of socialist

countries , so such total is larger than that used in Table 1.

Professor

Charles P. Kindleber ger reminds me that there are problems with using 1938
as a reference year, as prices for primary products were particula rly depressed
then.
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Table 3
Average annual growth rates of Latin American and other exports,
at current dollar values, 1938-71 (Percenta ges)
1938-48
--

1948-58

1958-68

1968- 71

Argentina , Brazil, Colombia, Mexico

14 .o

-0.5

4.0

10.4

Venezuela

19 .8

8.4

0.3

7.2

Chi le, Cuba, Peru

13.1

1.6

5.6

n.a.

Central American Common Market

12.5

6.6

7.7

5.7

Other small countries

12.4

3.9

5.5

7.2

All LDCs

11. 2

4.1

6. l

11.5

9.4

6.0

R.4

13. 6

5.9

2.0

0.9

3.6

World
Addendum:

U.S. Wholesale Industria l
Price Index

n.a. = Data are not available for complete period
Sources and Method:

As in

Tables 1 and 2, and Internati onal Monetary Fund,

Internati onal Financial Statistic s
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Table 4
Export performance of Latin American countries, by groups of
commodities and geographical destination, 1960-1971
(Percentages)
Argentina.
Brazi 1,
Colombia,
Mexico

Venezuela

Chile,
Peru

Central
American
Common
Market

Other
Small
Countries
(excluding
Haiti)

Average annual growth rates
of dollar value of exports
All merchandise exports

6.3

2.5

6.5

9.0

5.4

All manufactured exports

22.0

23.4

6.1

21. 8

11.0

4.5

2.4

6.5

7. 1

5.1

11.8

5.2

9.7

21.0

13. 2

5.6

2.2

6.2

6.8

4.8

Primary products
All exports to Latin America

All exports to the rest of

th~ world

Sources and method:

Basic data obtained from United Nations, Economic Commission

for Latin America.

Notas sobre la Economfa y el Desarrollo De Amtrica Latina,

Numbers 119, 120 and 121, of January /February 1973.

'Manufactured exports,. are

those included in the sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 (but excluding chapter 68, non-ferrous
metals) of the SITC.

Cuba and Haiti were excluded due to lack of data.
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Table 5
Structure of Export Increases Between 1960 and 1971
(Percentages of the increase in tota 1 merchandise exports, at current dollars)
Argentina.
Brazil,
Colombia.
Mexico

Venezuela

Chile,
Peru

Central
American
Common
Market

Other
Small
Countries
( excluding
Haiti)

-----Manufactured exports to
Latin America

14.5

2.3

2.2

31.0

4.3

Manufactured exports to
the Rest of the World

23.3

1.5

0.7

0.3

7.2

6.7

18. 2

13. 2

7.4

13. 7

55.5

78.0

H3. ~1

61. 2

Primary products to
Latin America
Primary Products to the
Rest of the World

74. 7
-·-·-·--

Total

Sources and method:

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Basic data obtained from United Nations, Economic Commission

for Latin America, Notas sabre la Economfa y el Desarrollo De Am~rica Latina,
Numbers 119, 120 and 121, of January/February 1973.

''Manufactured exports''

are those included in the sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 (but excluding chapter 68,
non-ferrous metals) of the SITC, Cuba and Haiti were excluded due to lack of
data.
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Argentina:

Contributio n to Total Export Expansion Between 1960 and 1971
of the Ten Largest Export Lines in 1971
(in percentages of total export expansion)

Corn

33.9%

Frozen, chilled and processed beef

22. 3

Sorghum

15. 6

Hides and skins

-0. 2

Wool

-11. 7

?ellets, cakes and expellers (ani.rri41 feed)

5. 0

Other meats, offals and by-products

3. 9

Fresh fruits

3. 8

Wheat

-14.2

Linseed oil

-1. 0

--TOTAL

57. 5%

Addendum:
Average annual growth rate, dollar value of all
merchandise exports, 1960-71

4.4%

Sources and method: Basic data obtained from Direcci6n Nacional de
Estadistica y Censos, Boletin Mensual De Estadistica , several
issues.
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Table 7
Brazil: Contribution to Total Export Expansion Between 1960 and 1972
of the Ten Largest Export Lines in 1972, Excluding Green Coffee
(in percentages of the total export expansion)
Raw sugar

9.6%

Soybeans, including cake and bran

10.3

Iron ore

6.6

Beef:

7. 9

chilled, frozen or processed

Raw cotton

5. 3

Boilers, machines and mechanical devices and instruments;
including office machines, earth moving and drilling
equipment, and machine tools

3. 7

Rolling stock and vehicles

2. 5

Processed coffee

2. 5

Pinewood, sawn

0.6

Cocoa beans

-0.4
TOTAL

48. 6%

Addendum:
Contribution of Green Coffee to the 1960-72
export expansion

10.2%

Average annual growth rate, dollar value of all
merchandise exports, 1960-72

10.0%

Average annual growth rate, dollar value of all
merchandise exports, excluding green coffee, 1960-72

15.1%

Sources and method: Basic data obtained, thanks to Edmar Bacha, from CACEX,
INFORMACAO SEMANAL, June 4, 1973; BOLETIM DO BANCO CENTRAL DO BRAZIL,
February 1973; and IBGE, 0 BRASIL EM NUMEROS, 19660
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Colomb ia: Contrib ution to Total Export Expans ion Between 1960 and 1970
of the Ten Larges t Export Lines in 1970, Exclud ing Green Coffee
and Crude Petrole um
(in percent ages of the total export expans ion)
Raw cotton

8.1%

Banana s and other fresh fruit

1. 7

Live cattle

6.4

Raw sugar

5. 5

Fuel oil and other refined petrole um produc ts

2. 6

Cotton textile s

4. 3

Unman ufactur ed tobacco

1. 8

Pellets , _cakes and expelle rs (animal feed)

2. 3

Leathe r and its manufa ctures

1. 9

Frozen and chilled meat

1. 7

TOTAL

36.1%

Addendum:
Contri bution of green coffee and crude petrole um
to export expans ion, 1960-70
Averag e annual growth rate, dollar value of all
mercha ndise exports , 1960-70
Averag e annual growth rate, dollar value o·f all
mercha ndise exports , exclud ing green coffee
and crude petrole um, 1960-70

41. 8%

4. 7%

14. 9%

Source s and method : Basic data obtaine d from Departa mento Admin istrativ
o
Nacion al De Estadi stica, Anuario De Comerc io Exterio r, severa l issues.
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Table 9
Mexico: Contribution to Total Export Expansion Between
1960 and 1972 of the Ten Largest Export Lines in 1972
(in percentages of total export expansion)
Raw cotton

-o. 9%

Live cattle

7. 8

Raw sugar

4. 6

Tomatoes

6. 8

Coffee

1. 3

Shrimp

4.1

Electrical machinery, appliances and parts

5. 7

Parts and pieces of machinery (castings and forgings)

5. 2

Frozen and chilled meat

4.4

Parts and pieces for transport vehicles

4.4
TOTAL

43.4%

Addendum:
Average annual growth rate, dollar value of all
merchandise exports, 1960-72

7.8%

Sources and method: Basic data obtained from official foreign trade
statistics of Mexico, including those published in Banco Nacional
de Comercio Exterior, Comercio Exterior.
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Notes
*Help from Edmar Bacha, Benjamin I. Cohen, Juan Giral, Roberto Gonzalez
Cofino, Charles P. Kindleber ger, Christina Lanfer and Vahid Nowshirva ni
are gratefull y acknowled ged.

This paper also benefited from discussio ns

held at the conferenc e on "Problems of Internati onal Division of Labor,"
sponsored by the Kiel Institute of World Economics , during July 1973.

Jj

See my "Trade Policies and Economic Developme nt, 11 Yale Economic Growth
Center Discussio n Paper No. 180, June 1973.

ll

The greater stability of the 1960s export expansion is documente d in my
"Planning the Foreign Sector in Latin America," The American Economic
Review, Noo 2, Vol. IX, May 1970, pp. 169-80.

J/

According to UNECLA calculati ons, export and import dollar unit values
for the whole of Latin A--nerica (excluding Cuba for lack of data),
evolved as follows, with 1963 equal to 100:
Exports

Imports

Tenns of Trade

1960

103

96

107

1965

104

106

98

1971

120

116

103

See UNECLA, America Latina y la Estrategi a de Desarroll o:
Evaluaci6 n Regional.
!±./

Primera

(mimeo), January 1973, Part II, Table 8, page 83.

The expansion of sugar and tobacco exports experienc ed by several.L atin
American countries during the 1960s, however, was to a large extent the
consequen ce of the unfortuna te blockade imposed against Cuba by a group
of Western Hemispher e nations.
This is not quite right.

Import tariffs and restrictio ns, of course,

lead to overvalue d exchange rates and negative effective rates of pro
tection to export industrie s.

But it can be argued that these policies
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may have partly caused the improvement observed in the Latin American
terms of trade during the late 1960s.

It is difficult to quantify this

point, particularly in light of growing African competition to several
traditional Latin American staples.
~/

For example, before and during the second world war, Argentina exported
leather shoes and cotton and wool textiles.
Argentina manufactured exports fell sharply.

After 1947, however,
See my Essays on the

Economic History of the Argentine Republic, (New Haven:

Yale University

Press, 1970), particularly pp. 262-64.

II

The debate over the excesses of import substitution should always be
placed in historical context~ bearing in mind what was happening to
world trade.

Few would agree that the welfare effects of the p~otec

tionist regimes adopted by many Latin American countries during the 1930s
were particularly, or even, negative, given the conditions which existed
in world markets during those years.
could be imagined.

No doubt more refined policies

But on the whole, policy performance in countries

such as Colombia~ Brazil and Argentina was reasonably good in the area
of foreign trade.

During the 1940s the world lived with either war or

fear of a new war, which came in the form of a localized conflict in
Korea.

So perhaps the debate can be narrowed mainly to what went on

during 1950-65, or perhaps just 1955-65.
§_/

See G. C. Hufbauer, "The Impact of National Characteristics and Tech
nology on the Connnodity Composition of Trade in Manufactured Goods,"
in R. Vernon, editor, The Technology Factor in International Trade,
New York:

Columbia University Press, 1970.

tained as in Table 8.

The Colombian data was ob
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ff

Some consolation for the late start may be derived from the thought that
Latin American countries are now in a better position to take advantage
of the "backward linkages" arising from export expansion than they were
twenty years ago.

10/

But not much should be made of this point.

The Brazilian experience has been analyzed in J. B. Donges, Brazil's
Trotting Peg; A New Approach to Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility in
Less Developed Countries, American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
D.

c.,

1971.

Within the 1960s Latin American context, Chile was the

first country to adopt a crawling peg (in April 1965), followed by
Colombia (in March 1967), and then by Brazil (in 1968).

Chile discon

tinued its crawling peg policy after July 1970.
11/

Data obtained from International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics.

12/

Those results, and their limitations, are discussed in my "Minor Colom
bian Merchandise Exports," Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper
No. 149, July 1972.

13/

See in particular J. Bhagwati and A.

o. Krueger, "Exchange control,

liberalization and economic development," American Economic Review, May
1973.
14/

As reported in UNECLA, "El Desarrollo De Las Exportaciones No Tradicionales
De America Latina" (mimeo), January 1973, p. 11.

15/

See Juan Carlos Casas, "Las Multinacionales y el Comercio Latinoamericano,"
CEMLA Boletin Mensual, Vol. XVIII, No. 12, December 1972, pp. 605-14.

